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Abstract
Purpose of paper: Due to the growing importance of the role of chairman, as much as a
result of voluntary and legislative governance requirements, a study of
national configurational demographics was undertaken in order to
determine the spread of understanding of the chairman’s role,
performance and contribution.
Design/methodology: Qualitative methodology, exploratory in nature through in-depth
interviews and workshop discussion involving 103 UK, US and
Australian participants, was undertaken.
Findings: The role of chairman is considered as having a distinct effect on board
dynamics, role and contribution and the monitoring and support of
management. In particular, nine demographic factors are identified as
affecting the manner in which the role of chairman is exercised in the
UK, USA and Australia.
Research limitations: The findings of this qualitative exploratory study need to be integrated
into a quantitative empirical survey in order to ascertain the validity of
the results to date.
3Practical
implications:
The two key conclusions, that each role incumbent has extensive
discretion to shape and determine the chairman role as well as
national demographic characteristics influencing the practice of
chairmanship, highlights the requirement for governance due
diligence, examining the financial and competitive strength of the
organisation as well as uncovering contextual sensitivities. Each
position of chairman is different to the other.
What is original/
value of paper:
Insufficient attention has been given to the role of chairman. The
study offers additional insight on how demographic factors influence
the shaping and determination of the role of chairman. This paper
should be of interest to practitioners, consultants, line managers, board
members, chairmen, management academics and business studies
students.
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5Arising as a counter to US and UK corporate corrupt practice of the 1980s and 1990s, greater
attention to governance protocols introduced discipline to board processes and procedures in
order to safeguard the interests of the shareholders of the enterprise. Either as a result of
legislation or ‘voluntary’ code emanating from securities commissions, stock exchanges,
investors associations as well as supranational organisations (OECD, 1999), and despite
variance in scope and detail, boards are increasingly being required to display attentiveness to
four fundamental principles of governance (Coombes and Wong, 2004), namely;
 the upholding of shareholder rights;
 clarity of accountability for both the board and management which, in turn, has
spawned greater attention to the role, purpose and contribution of both entities;
 the accuracy, transparency and timeliness of financial and non financial reporting; and
 attendance to the interests of minority shareholders and other pertinent stakeholders.
As a result, the enterprise is required to provide a financial return on shareholder investment,
which commentators as Kay and Silbertson (1995) point out, is the sole purpose of the
publicly quoted company. Thus, two counter balancing pressures are prevalent on the board
of the Anglo-American enterprise, the realising of profit for shareholders involving the
exercising of governance disciplines for the protection of shareholder rights, and the nurturing
of a proactive business culture for the purpose of financial and reputational gain. The
juggling of interests to achieve both ends falls on the shoulders of the chairman of the board, a
position that has reached public prominence as much due to the popular emergence of
corporate governance (Hanson and Song, 2000; Kakabadse et al., 2006).
Governance, Controls and the Chairman
6The requirement for profitability within the Anglo-American governance model of dispensed
shareholder ownership within a liquid capital market whilst simultaneously promoting
shareholder rights, has introduced two mechanisms of control over the affairs of the
corporation; internal and external (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). The internal control
mechanism is exercised through the one-tier board, composed of executive and non executive
directors in the UK and Australian context and that of ‘outside’ directors in the USA, who are
recognised as independent or ‘grey’ directors that have a close but indirect relationship with
the firm (Hanson and Song, 2000). The long standing and still unchallenged contribution of
each board director is to represent shareholders, namely the owners of the corporation, by
holding accountable the management of the enterprise (Berle and Means, 1932).
External control consists of market forces such as distinct competitive factors in particular
markets, developments in capital markets and labour markets, with the exercise of control
being totally in the remit of professional management (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). In themselves, market based competitive factors are considered to play a
critical monitoring role as far as the company’s performance is concerned (Berle and Means,
1932). For example, under-performing firms become an easy take-over target, often resulting
in management and the board being replaced by the acquirer (Monk and Minow, 2004).
Additionally, competitiveness in the labour market, especially in the executive recruitment
market is significant in terms of external control as it is challenging for a declining company
to attract high performing talent at a time when such talent is most needed (Monk and Minow,
2004).
Prior to the emergence of the governance movement, each shareholder in possession of a
majority or minority holding, when concerned about firm performance or reporting issues,
7would more likely ‘vote with their feet’ (sell their shares) than actively participate in
exercising their rights, such as the monitoring and dismissal of management. A simple cost–
benefit analysis of the day showed ‘it is not worth it’, it being to, “exercise ownership rights
and become involved in the affairs of the enterprise for that would incur the total cost of
intervention for only a pro rata share of the gains, and even then if there is any” (Monk and
Minow, 2004). Thus, managers were left considerably free to adopt an ‘oligarchic’ presence
and style. One role in particular has, and continues to have, the potential to allow its
incumbent to behave in an aloof and unchecked manner, and that is that of the chief executive
officer (CEO). The CEO role is a full-time post, embracing the responsibility for the day-to-
day running of the company and for the setting (for most corporations) and implementing of
corporate strategy (Cadbury, 1992; Dahya and Travlos, 2000; Weir and Laing, 2001). The
long established practice of including the CEO on the corporate board is to allow board
members direct access to this critical officer for the purposes of holding him/her accountable
for the performance of the firm and for communicating progress towards the realisation of
strategic and operational goals (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991: 442; Gioia and Thomas, 1996;
Ward, 1996).
With the recognition that an unrestrained CEO and his/her team were a prime root of
corporate excess, the role of chairman in UK and Australian companies was elevated to the
role of the ‘keeper of the board’ and also the ‘minder of the CEO’ (Kakabadse et al., 2006).
The monitoring of management by the non executive directors (NEDs) and the holding of the
CEO accountable by the chairman allowed boards to gain a greater role in strategy
formulation, providing independent judgement on senior executive appointments and
determining performance related rewards. Thus, whether part-time, full-time, executive or
non executive, emphasis has increasingly been placed on the chairman’s effective leadership
8of the board as well as the ‘mentoring’ of the CEO and executive management (Cadbury,
1992; Dahya and Travlos, 2000; Weir and Laing, 2001). According to Cadbury (1992),
chairmen hold the responsibility of stewarding boardroom affairs by, for example, ensuring
that non executive directors are in receipt of relevant information for board meetings (as well
as any other pertinent company information) as well as to audit the affairs of the firm and
determine the structure of remuneration for its senior full-time officers. In order to maintain
impartiality, Cadbury (1992), and Higgs (2003) a decade later, argued that chairmen should
be distanced from day-to-day company operations.
However, the downside to improved corporate governance is the simultaneous emergence of
‘regulation creep’ as, the UK’s Combined Code (Higgs, 2003) recommends 82 provisions for
board adoption, which is a substantial increase of protocol to that recommended by Cadbury
(1992). A number of commentators complain that the greater attention to governance
processes has over-emphasised the ‘comply’ side of the ‘comply and explain’ duality of
governance, moving to a principle of ‘comply or breach’, thus positioning corporate
governance as a tick box exercise rather than a deeper analysis of managerial and corporate
practice (Coombes and Wong, 2004). The drift to compliance, as opposed to investigation
and understanding, has even further elevated the stature of the role of chairman. Partly to
ensure that the ‘tick box’ mentality does not emerge but also to facilitate exploration of key
enterprise issues framed as “strategies”, “change”, “goals”, “competitiveness”, “risk”,
“opportunities” and so on, the chairman is now viewed by an increasing number of
commentators as holding equal status to that of the CEO (Kakabadse et al., 2001). With such
a breadth of responsibility and influence, it is recognised that a chairman should not replicate
the previous excesses of CEOs but instead attain consensus amongst board members by
facilitating inclusive decision-making processes and drawing upon board members’ wealth of
9experience in terms of market and environment scanning and interpretation (Weick and
Roberts, 1993). In ascertaining the nature of effective decision processes, two UK based
studies, consisting of 134 chairmen in the first instance and 300 in the second (Dulewicz and
Herbert, 1999; 2004), found no evidence that chairmen or board members believed that voting
is a healthy manifestation of board decision-making, emphasising instead the merging of
interests towards a ‘collective mind’ (Lonergan, 1957). Parker (1990) agreed, positioning the
role of chairman as that of looking outward and forward, a “leader-chairman”, whilst the CEO
manages the day-to-day affairs of the firm. Similarly, Garratt (1999: 29) names the chairman
the “boss of the board” whose role is to “induct, include and train to competence each director
and the board as a collective whole”, a view with which others concur (Roberts, 2002; Austin,
2005). Roberts (2002) argues that the chairman is key to ensuring that boards play a
‘complementary’ role to the CEO in the direction and control of the company, whatever their
particular combination of duties and activities. In so doing, the CEO has an invaluable set of
additional resources to draw upon. The sensitive inter linkage between the role of chairman
and CEO is further illustrated by the Florou (2005) eight year study concluding that a prime
function of chairman is the dismissal of failing CEOs. Cognisant of the ever growing
importance of chairmen, the Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA, 2004) guidelines
suggest that the workload and the duty of the chairman are three times that of ordinary
boardroom directors, requiring the role holder to allow for a minimum commitment of 360
hours (or 45 working days) per year. The ASA also concluded that any individual who sits on
more than five boards is offering a disservice to each of the company’s shareholders (ASA,
2004; Galacho, 2004).
On the basis that the chairman of the board has become, and has been recognised to become,
ever more critical to the sustainable future of the firm, this paper explores the nature of the
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chairman’s role and practice (Cutting and Kouzmin, 2004). A review of the interpretations of
the role, responsibilities and contribution of the chairman, contrasting UK and US practice,
precedes reporting the results of an international, qualitative survey of the demographic
influences determining the role and practice of US, UK and Australian chairmen. Challenged
is the assumption that the role of chairman is universally comparable. Scrutinised are certain
configurational factors that are considered to provide shape to the role of chairman,
parameters within which each incumbent determines the ‘finer’ nature of their role. The
paper concludes that nationally determined configurational demographics influence the
identity and boundaries of the role of chairman, thus calling into question whether the
position of chairman can be considered as a universal managerialist concept.
Chairman: Role in Context
Most pundits concur that with the ever greater demand for effective governance and
transparency, the quality and capabilities of the chairman are critical to the performance of the
board and, in turn, the enterprise (Kakabadse et al., 2001). A summary of recent studies
outlining the characteristics of high performing chairmen is provided (Table 1).
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Table 1: Chairman: Attributes of Effective Performance
Author Study Type Characteristics of High Performing Chairman
Parker (1990) Qualitative study  Outward looking
 Forward looking
Stewart (1991) Longitudinal qualitative study
of 20 GMs and chairmen in
the NHS (UK)
 Interdependent, complimentary –
partnership with CEO
 Balancing activities among key figures
Cadbury (1992) Experiential practice (UK)  Leadership of the board
 External face of the company (e.g.
investors)
Garratt (1999) Experimental practice  Boss of the board
 Designee and chair of the board’s
meetings/activities
 New board member induction
 Competency development of board
members
 Promotes board development
Kakabadse et al.
(2001)
95 directors (35 in-depth,
semi-structured interviews and
three focus groups of 20)
NEDs/Chairmen, CEOs –
FTSE 100 (UK)
 Maturity
 Relational skills
 High political and social competence
 Meetings skills
 Coaching skills
 Effective management of boardroom
dynamics
Roberts (2002) 35 interviews with chairmen,
CEOs and NEDs (UK)
 Minimal ambition for executive power
 Complimentary to CEO (i.e. supporting
role of executive) in:
− Skills
− Experience
− Knowledge
− Temperament
− Business focus, or
− Values
 Chairs meetings (e.g. focusing,
stimulating discussion, generating
openness, trust)
 Dismissing/appointing CEO
In determining the nature of the skill set of the chairman, considerable research has linked the
performance effectiveness of the board to the quality of boardroom dynamics (Kakabadse and
Kakabadse, 1999). The chairman’s skill in managing often complex and sensitive
relationships, with board directors expressing differences of view on strategy whilst striving
to attain meaningful consensus on board and enterprise wide issues, is viewed as fundamental
to the long-term future of the firm (Cadbury, 1992; Taylor, 2001).
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The relational skills to lead through complex boardroom interactions, mindful of respecting
and yet being assertive with critical board members such as the CEO, displaying a maturity of
temperament in order not to appear as threatening to other board members and executive
management and facilitating open communication, have emerged as the key elements of
effective chairmanship (Roberts, 2002).
However, despite broad consensus from Anglo-American based studies of the skill set of
chairmen, national demographic differences have equally been identified as determining the
nature and responsibility span of chairmen. It is common practice in the UK and Australia for
the role of chairman to be separated from that of CEO. The UK’s Code of Best Practice,
initially formulated through Cadbury (1992), recommended that the functions of CEO and
chairman of the board should be split, with the chairman being responsible for the leadership
of the board and for acting as the external face of the company, particularly in relation to
investors. Through such division of responsibilities, no one individual emerges with
unfettered power over the firm’s strategic and operational decisions (Cadbury, 1992; Higgs,
2003). The effect of Cadbury was significant. The percentage of UK firms adopting
separation of roles increased from 48.4% in 1985 to 90.2% by 1995 (Hanson and Song,
2000). By 2003, 1,689 chairman posts of 1,702 listed companies were held by executive or
non executive board directors but not by the CEO (Higgs, 2003). In the same year, of the
FTSE 100 companies, only five reported joint chairman/CEO roles whilst 24 chairmen were
formerly the CEO of the same company (Higgs, 2003).
The UK’s self-regulatory model of governance makes the chairman ultimately accountable for
the activities and personnel of the corporation, particularly as UK company law draws no
distinction between the responsibilities of executive and non executive directors (DTI, 2000).
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Similar to the UK Westminster model of government where the Prime Minister acts as ‘first
among equals’, shaping both the Cabinet and Parliament, the chairman, irrespective of being
externally appointed or elected from within the board, occupies a similarly critically
influential role within the board and across executive management. The Cadbury Code
(Cadbury, 1992) and consequent corporate governance codes and reports, such as the Hempel
(1998) report, emphasised that all directors are equally responsible for developing and
implementing the company’s strategy as well as for attending to the governance of the
company. Thus the motto “one for all and all for one (un pour tous, tous pour un)”,
traditionally associated with the King’s Musketeers (royal guards) captured in the 1844
French novel by Alexandre Dumas, is a useful analogy of statement of solidarity between the
members of the board as well as between them and executive management. Supportive of the
‘team bonding’ theme, it was the Higgs (2003) report that emphasised the pivotal role of
chairman in crafting the conditions for director and board effectiveness. Higgs (2003)
recommended that the chairman should be responsible for;
 the leading of the board, ensuring its effectiveness and for setting its agenda;
 ensuring the provision of accurate, timely and clear information to directors;
 ensuring for transparent and relevant communication to shareholders;
 arranging for the regular evaluation of the performance of the board, its committees
and individual directors;
 enhancing the contribution of non executive directors; and
 ensuring for constructive relations between executive and non executive directors.
In order to maintain the spirit of role separation, an emerging UK based trend is to recruit the
chairman from existing non executive positions and not migrate the CEO to the position of
chairman (Kakabadse et al., 2006). In fact, Higgs (2003: 81) specifically suggested that the
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“chief executive should not go on to become chairman of the same company” (Table 2). The
Higgs (2003) view is that a chairman, independent of immediate executive concerns, is more
likely to provide objective opinion on proposals, be more effective in monitoring decisions
and be more likely to promote shareholder interests (Weir and Laing, 2001). Thus, the critical
and central nature of the role of chairman in the UK is considered as one of great prestige and
the pinnacle of a successful career, likely facilitating access to government commissions, to
boards of charities or other ‘worthy’ social entities. Remuneration, however, is often only
10% to 20% of that of the CEO (Coombes and Wong, 2004). That being said, the average
UK non executive chairman’s pay varies considerably. A survey of 33 boards by Pass (2004)
found that the spread of non executive chairmen remuneration varied between £125,000 in
Northern Foods Ltd. to £480,000 at Vodafone, with the average for internationally renowned
companies emerging at £222,000.
Emphasised is the attention that needs to be given to maintaining a positive and supportive
relationship between that of chairman and CEO (Westphal, 1998; Meyer, 2000; Kakabadse et
al., 2001). Recognising that the role and contribution of chairman varies according to each
corporate context, UK based studies (Stewart, 1991; Pettigrew, 1992; Kakabadse et al., 2001;
Roberts, 2002) have concluded that the relationship between the chairman and CEO is critical
to the sustainable future of the firm, irrelevant of the diversity and magnitude of challenges
they both, and the organisation, face. Even studies of 40 years ago (Hodgson et al., 1965)
observed the ‘complementarity of functions’ between chairman and CEO, with Stewart
(1991) stating that the chairman role and executive director’s role within the context of the
UK’s health services, are mutually inter-dependent. Kakabadse et al. (2006), in their recent
study of CEO/chair interrelations, reveal that the chair/CEO complementarity resembles a
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‘generative dance’ of constant attention to changes of mood and circumstance and, above all,
the observable display of trust and respect for the other.
Despite the few studies of chairmen conducted in Australia, emerging evidence indicates
comparability with UK practice, where chairman and CEO roles are separate with both
reporting to boards predominantly consisting of non executive directors (Nicholson and Kiel,
2004; Table 2). The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) requires that
chairman/CEO roles should be separated but in the few circumstances where the two are
combined, an independent non executive director be appointed as the deputy chairman, who
would act as the voice of independent reason (Bosch, 1995). For Australian boards, the
chairman is recognised as the lead director determining the board agenda, undertaking public
relations responsibilities and ensuring that board meetings run smoothly (Nicholson and Kiel,
2004). The chairman is also identified as the driving force behind board evaluation,
facilitating the development of board directors, executive management and particularly that of
the CEO (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004).
In contrast, to both the UK and Australia, role separation is not broadly observed in the USA
whereby the roles of CEO, president and chairman are all one for the majority of the 6,703
publicly listed US companies whose stock is actively traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (Wilshire Mutual Funds, 2005). Approximately 20% of the Standard and Poor 500
companies have separated the role of chairman and CEO/president (Ward, 1996; Coombes
and Wong, 2004; Table 2). Within the American system, ultimate power lies with the role of
president/chairman/CEO, whilst all other corporate actors fundamentally exist to assist the
chairman/CEO/president to realise his/her goals and vision (Cutting and Kouzmin, 1998).
Thus it is the CEO/president/chair who sets the agenda and determines the quantity, quality
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and timing of information for the board (Monk and Minow, 2004). Legal, financial
accountability and probity lie with the combined role of chair/CEO and CFO (Ward, 1996;
Table 2).
Table 2: National Variance of Governance
Context UK USA Australia
Governance practice Self regulatory (‘comply
or explain’ approach)
Legislation driven Self regulation but strictly
conforming to national
regulatory authorities
(Australian Securities and
Investments Commission;
Securities and Exchange
Commission)
Legal responsibility ‘Collective
responsibility’ – ‘no
difference’ between
executive and non
executive directors
(shared liability)
Chairman/CEO and
CFO (chief financial
officer) carry legal
responsibilities –
certification of financial
reports under Sarbanes-
Oxley (2002)
Chair has ultimate
accountability
Role separation Clear preference for
separation (92% of UK’s
1,702 listed companies)
Role duality. Only
approximately 20% of
US’s 6,703 listed
companies have split
chair/CEO roles
Clear preference for
separation (90% of 1,774
Australian listed companies)
Independent directors At least one half of the
board (Higgs, 2003)
Substantial majority of
the board (both
independent and grey) –
often all, with exception
of CEO (NYSE
Conference Board, New
York Stock Exchange,
2003)
Substantial majority of the
board – often all, with
exception of CEO
Role duality has given licence to the chairman/CEO/president to carve and shape the
corporation into a structure uniquely fitted to their personality and goals (Ward, 1996: 112).
Not surprising therefore that US management and leadership literature has focused on the
image of the strong chairman/CEO/president, wielding power to reallocate resources,
exercising their personal influence to motivate others to achieve their goals and building a
vision of the corporation’s future that is inspirational and shared with enthusiastic followers
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). The US leadership literature paints a picture of
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preference to be led by a visible, dominant and powerful ‘supreme commander’, or hero
figure, representing American values and reflecting a personalised and idiosyncratic influence
on the board of the US corporation (Garratt, 2003; Monk and Minow, 2004). Further, US
executive pay for top managerial positions is considerably higher than that of their
counterparts abroad, reflecting the American belief that successful people should display their
accomplishment through material gain (Monk and Minow, 2004: 341).
However, there has been a reaction to the ‘one-man’ dominance of the American corporation.
Certain US States, such as Pennsylvania and Connecticut, have limited the singular control of
the CEO/chair/president by adopting corporate laws similar to Germany, Japan and Canada
which recognise, to varying extent, the director’s duty is to take into account non-shareholder
corporate stakeholders. However, more than 50% of US publicly listed companies and more
than 60% of the Fortune 500 companies are registered under a Delaware statute that holds that
directors are required to own an “unyielding” duty to the corporation and its shareholders and,
by implication, few others (Greenfield, 2004: 105).
In fact, the role duality of chairman/CEO/president reflects the political governance model of
the American President, who can choose his Cabinet from non elected members and where
Cabinet members basically serve at the President’s favour, though they are required to be
ratified by the Congress (similar to directors being ratified by a body of shareholders).
Despite the US influence across the globe, the governance model of role duality is under
attack. Research and deliberation has shown that;
 amongst the six principal symptoms for corporate collapse highlighted by Argenti
(1976), the ‘one man rule’ or combined chairman/CEO/president role, tops the list;
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others being non participative boards, unbalanced management top teams, lack of
management depth and weak finance functions;
 corporate scandals and cases of executive folly are on the increase, with the
chairman/CEO/president identified as being at the centre of so-called wrongdoing
(Beasley et al., 1999; Charan and Useem, 2002);
 pressure from the Blue Ribbon Committee (Debman, 2002) continues for the dividing
of the chairman/CEO role into two positions. Proposed is that the role of non
executive chair be given to an independent, non executive director having the
authority to determine both the board agenda and the quality and flow of information
to the board; and
 scholars have repeatedly argued that role duality creates a structural impediment to the
transparency and independence of non executive (external) directors (Pearce and
Zahra, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 1994; Beasley, 1996; Slatter and Lovett, 1999; Monk
and Minow, 2004).
In response to further corporate scandal, regulatory adjustment was introduced in the form of
the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002), which avoided tackling the issue of role duality (Andert, 2005)
but instead Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) introduced legal culpability for the falsification of
information by senior corporate officers. Also accentuated under Sarbanes-Oxley was the
importance of the nominations committee to counter balance the power of the
chairperson/CEO.
Possibly due to role duality but also due to its limited remunerative potential, chairmanship in
the USA holds a less prestigious status than that of the CEO (Coombes and Wong, 2004).
The less demanding, relatively poorly paid role of part-time chairman is identified as less
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appealing to the highly successful US executive, even on their retirement, in comparison to
their full-time managerial role (Coombes and Wong, 2004). More common is for top US
executives to accept public-service responsibilities on or close to their retirement, thus further
limiting the motivation to separate the roles and attract candidates for chairman who are
active, full-time or part-time executive professionals (Coombes and Wong, 2004).
Conscious of the critique of role duality, a number of empirical studies have sought to test the
effect of role combination against financial and non financial performance indicators. The
emerging picture, however, is inconclusive (Daily and Dalton, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998).
Certain studies highlight that powerful, independently minded boards are more progressive
and are associated with superior financial performance than boards dominated by the one
chairman/CEO/president (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Other studies (Dalton et al., 2003;
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2004) conclude that board configuration is no panacea for board
effectiveness. Further, recent scandals have revealed that companies with separate and
combined roles have failed to be diligent with their oversight function (Kakabadse et al.,
2006). On balance, however, Coombes and Wong (2004) consider the argument for
separating the roles of CEO and chairman as more persuasive. Through role separation,
boards are given a structural basis for acting independently and for nurturing an environment
which will allow the chairman and other board members to challenge the CEO without fear of
giving (or attracting) offence (Coombes and Wong, 2004).
Yet despite recent research, a paucity of insight of the consequences of continuing with the
chairman/CEO role duality, particularly in terms of corporate performance and sustainability,
exists (Stewart, 1991). Most of the studies pursued have been quantitative in nature, extracted
from data sets rather than from observation and interaction with in-situ boardroom directors,
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with the results being “bound to be equivocal because the effectiveness of a particular board
depends not only on composition and structure but also on the will and skill of individual
board members and the interpersonal and group processes through which their energies are
combined” (Roberts, 2002: 496).
Irrespective of the need for further knowledge, increased pressure from shareholders in the
wake of public scandal has pressured US boards to introduce the role of ‘lead director’ to act
as the go-between between the chairman/CEO/president and the other board directors, to
consult with the chairman/CEO/president on the drafting of the board agenda, to provide
independent challenge, to consult with the chairman/CEO/president on the selection of the
board committee members and sub-committee chairpersons, to ensure for adequacy of
information directors receive and to directly contribute to improving the effectiveness of
board meetings. Recent trends indicate that approximately 30% of the largest US enterprises
now have a lead director on their board (Coombes and Wong, 2004). Defenders of role
duality argue that the ‘lead director’ model, combined with other measures such as requiring
boards to have a majority of independent directors and that they hold meetings without the
presence of management, obviates the need for the separation of roles (Coombes and Wong,
2004).
The Study
Conscious of the growing importance of the role of chairman in the UK and Australia and of
the emerging pressures to ‘better’ balance US boards, a comparative, international study of
the national configurational demographics that could affect the role identity, performance and
contribution of the chairman, was undertaken. As the study was exploratory in nature, a
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qualitative methodology was adopted through in-depth interviews and workshop exploratory
sessions with 103 chairmen of UK, US and Australian listed companies (Table 3).
Table 3: Data Source
Boardroom Role UK
(FTSE 150)
USA
(S & P 500)
Australia
(ASX 50)
Chairman 35 - 33
CEO/chairman - 35 -
Many of the study participants held more than one board role such as being chairman of one
board, CEO to another organisation or non executive director (NED) and/or lead independent
director (LID) of an additional board. Considering that the purpose of the interview was to
understand the chairman’s role and contribution from the role incumbent’s perspective, “the
validity, mindfulness and insights generated … have more to do with the information-richness
of the cases selected and the observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher than with
the sample size” (Patton, 2002: 185).
In order to gain consistency across interviews, the framework of role theory (Katz and Kahn,
1966) was adopted in order to understand each incumbent’s role related expectations, their
interactions with and degree of influence over other board members and wider stakeholders
and how such experiences helped them shape their board role. The interviews ranged from
one to two hours, the majority conducted in-situ, namely the study respondent’s work place.
A series of common but open-ended themes were pursued allowing each respondent to
uniquely position their line of response. The approach allowed for commonality of response
across interviews whilst encouraging expansion into issues each interviewee considered
important. Interviews were carried out throughout 2005 and the first half of 2006. The
researchers adopted the philosophy of iterative development, devoting time after each
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interview to discuss its content and identify emergent critical themes to be explored in future
encounters (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Interviews were fully transcribed and additionally
independently read with the objective of identifying common themes across the narratives
(Riessman, 1993).
Study Findings
Nine demographic determinants were identified as effecting the discharge of the role and
responsibilities of chairman across the three samples, namely role boundary, executive or non
executive status, accountability spread, the driving of the vision, the recruitment of chairmen,
geographic domicile, counter balancing influence to that of the chairman, tenure and
governance application (Table 4).
All participants concurred that the role of chairman is of critical importance to board and
enterprise effectiveness, particularly so with the UK and Australian respondents. US
respondents agreed, but all but one declared themselves in support of role duality,
emphasising their capacity to apply different skills and capabilities when acting as CEO as
opposed to being chairman of the board.
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Table 4: Role of Chairman: Demographic Identity Determinants
Demographics UK USA Australia
Role boundary Chairman runs board;
CEO leads the
enterprise
CEO/chair leads the
enterprise and the board
Chairman role delineation
jointly determined with
CEO/MD
Status: executive or non
executive
Little difference in
practice
Executive dominant Extensive difference
Accountability Chairman accountable
for board performance
CEO/chairman
accountable for board and
business performance
Chairman accountable for
board and business
performance
Vision ownership Chairman: vision
passive
CEO/chairman: vision
active – if role split, then
passive
Chairman: vision active
Recruitment International National National
Domicile Not relevant Not relevant if role is
split, otherwise
CEO/chairman resides in
the same city as
headquarters
Chair resides in same city
as headquarters
Counter balancing role Senior independent
director (SID)
Lead independent director
(LID)
Deputy chairman (n.b.
little need for the counter
balance)
Tenure More effective longer
in role (12 to 15 years)
More effective longer in
role (8 to 10 years)
More effective longer in
role (12 to 15 years)
Governance application Voluntary: increasingly
compliant
Legislative: compliant Voluntary: compliant
Role Boundary
The role of chairman was initially reported as ‘uniquely’ enacted by each incumbent and
adapted to each boardroom context. Board context was reported as influenced by;
 the board’s history and culture;
 the norms of conduct within the enterprise;
 the pattern of selection to the job;
 the nature of socialisation with board colleagues;
 the degree to which each board member’s expectations of their role was realised (or
not);
 the quality of dialogue on the board;
 the nature of board power based relations; and
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 external conditions such as the influence of regulators, legislation, codes of practice,
stock exchange conditions and the demands of institutional investors.
Thus, the chairman’s contribution was described as individually and idiosyncratically enacted
from board to board and from country to country.
“Look, at the end of the day I decide how I wish to run my board.”
UK Chairman, Utilities Company
“More legislation; more demands, greater responsibilities but as chairman, it is up
to me to have the board I want and the chief executive that I feel is right for the
business.”
Australian Chairman, Banking Organisation
“Yes, Sarbanes-Oxley has had a substantial effect; for a start it’s expensive but I
made it happen. But irrespective of all that, I am the chairman I want to be. My
greatest concern is to make sure that I carry the board with me! Being chairman
and CEO, to have your board go against you causes real problems.”
USA Chairman/CEO/President, Insurance Company
Despite the distinctly personal and idiosyncratic approach toward chairmanship, through
probing, an underlying pattern was determined according to role delineation. UK chairmen
more reported themselves as focusing on board affairs, leaving the CEO to run the enterprise.
Intervention would only arise if it became evident that the CEO was seen to be ‘performing
poorly’.
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In contrast, US chairmen determined the nature of the separation of activities allocated to the
role of CEO and chair. Few reported that they discussed the allocation and manner of role
division with their board members. However, a minority stated that they made time for board
members to examine issues without the presence of any executive manager, including that of
themselves, when in the role of CEO. Therefore, either at the end of, or at the beginning of,
board meetings, non executive and independent directors were allocated time on their own to
discuss pertinent issues. In effect, for a minority of cases, the chairman/CEO left the room for
the other board members to continue debate.
Australian chairmen emerged as more dominant than their UK counterparts with the majority
reporting that they, together with their CEO or in many cases the managing director (MD),
jointly determined the nature of role delineation.
Executive/Non Executive Status
As much driven by a desire to have the CEO as the pivotal point of the enterprise and to be
supportive of management, UK chairmen reported little difference in the role of executive and
non executive chairman. The respondents indicated that the real difference was between
being a part-time or full-time chairman. All of the executive chairmen in the sample
emphasised the limited number of executive functions for which they were accountable (if
any). Whether executive or non executive, the principal involvement remained with attending
to the duties of board. Hence, the real difference was the level of involvement in the affairs of
the board and that of the firm. Full-time chairmen reported themselves as more involved in
the day to day affairs of the firm, whereas part-time chairmen reported greater reliance on the
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quality of relationship and level of trust with their CEO whilst having no executive functions
reporting to them.
“There is little difference between an executive and non executive chairman. The
real difference is between being full-time and part-time. At the end of the day, the
business reports to the CEO who reports to me. He runs the business. I look after
the board and if necessary we (chair and board) sack the CEO and appoint the
successor.”
UK Chairman, Transport Company
In terms of executive and non executive identity, the contrast between UK and Australian
chairmen was substantial. A greater number of Australian respondents reported themselves as
holding executive chairman responsibilities, in many cases subsuming the role of CEO. The
range of executive responsibilities adopted by Australian chairmen was greater than that of
their UK counterparts. A greater number of executive functions were identified in interview
as directly reporting to the Australian chairman. As a result, the role of CEO in Australian
companies was described as more akin to that of a managing director (MD) or even that of
chief operating officer (COO), but termed MD.
“There is a hell of a difference between being executive and non executive
chairman. I am an executive chairman and quite a few of the key functions report
to me. I have an MD not a CEO who, if I am honest, is more of a COO (chief
operating officer). Most Australians do not understand this quaint British thing of
‘exec and non exec’ chairs being more or less the same thing.”
Australian Chairman, International Food Company
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In the USA, the executive/non executive distinction did not emerge as a consideration due to
role duality. What was reported as critical was being mindful of the requirements of
Sarbanes-Oxley, that responsibility particularly falling on the shoulders of the CEO and chief
financial officer (CFO). Attention to due process and ensuring for governance transparency
was viewed as fundamental, although a sizeable proportion of US respondents emerged as
critical of Sarbanes-Oxley.
“I think Sarbanes-Oxley was an over reaction and it will take some time for the
dust to settle. As far as my company is concerned, we are a typical board where
chairman, president and CEO are all one guy - me - who has to stand before a
range of 14 external directors and basically explain how he takes sole
responsibility as the company’s decision maker. With my future always on the line,
I will tell you what I will do as chairman of the board and I don’t need Sarbanes-
Oxley to tell me that.”
Chairman, US Defence Company
Accountability Spread
The executive/non executive orientation to the role of chairman reflected in the nature and
spread of accountabilities across the three samples. UK respondents reported that the
chairman is held accountable for the board, its decisions, activities and performance. In
contrast, the chairman/CEO of US companies and the chairman of Australian companies
reported themselves as being held accountable for both board and firm performance, thus
having, for some, a number of executive functions reporting to them.
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Vision
Due to the accountability spread of the role of chairman, further differences emerged across
the three sample groups. In terms of identifying and promoting a vision for the future of the
firm, British chairmen reported their role as positioning the board to debate, challenge and
‘sign off’ on the vision of the CEO and his/her management team. The ‘more passive’ UK
chairman was contrasted by the ‘more proactive’ Australian chairman who reported distinct
involvement in, and for some outright determination of, the vision of the company. The
majority of Australian chairmen reported themselves as the ‘stewards’ of the vision of the
enterprise.
“I, together with the management, set the parameters for the vision and drive that
process through. I, like so many other Australian chairmen, act as the long-term
anchor for the company. Our top positions (CEO/MD) are often filled from outside
Australia, mainly Americans, and whether British or American, most of our CEOs
and MDs leave after three to five years. Therefore, I need to be the one to set the
vision. As it is, I am the one that is here for the long-term.”
Australian Chairman, Australian Manufacturing
“The CEO with his management team determines the vision and I and the board do
the ‘reality check’. If that does not survive board debate, back it goes for the CEO
and the team to revise. However from my experience that is rare as we would have
been discussing (CEO/chair with board) the shape of the vision in any case.”
UK Chairman, Energy Company
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The US respondents confirmed that the responsibility for the determination and the driving
forward of the vision was theirs. However, a number raised the issue of ownership and
dependency. Being the person shaping the strategic profile of the enterprise, it is all too easy
for others to look for direction from the chair/CEO, thus becoming dependent and not offering
constructive challenge. Additionally, lack of meaningful involvement from either the
management team or the board could induce little ownership for the vision that is generated.
Thus, most respondents referred to the delicate balance of ‘acting’ as CEO whilst in the role
of CEO and adopting a different style as chairman of the board.
“It is difficult being both CEO and board chairman, especially when under
pressure or when fatigued. Although I try, and try hard, I do not always become
more conciliatory as chairman of the board.”
US Chair/CEO/President, International Commodities Company
Recruitment
Not only the determination of the vision but also the practice of recruiting the chairman, was
identified as different across the three groups. Particularly in Australia, the study participants
emphasised that stringent effort was made to appoint ‘home grown talent’ in order to ensure
for long-term stability. As the Australian chairman of the manufacturing company quoted
above states, a common perception is that ‘better’ senior management talent is located off
shore. Australian chairmen highlighted that the average period of tenure for, particularly
American, but also British senior managers, was three to five years. Thus, Australian
chairmen saw themselves as ‘the anchor’ providing sustainability.
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“It is to do with taxation with the US executives we bring over. In America, with an
absence of five years, all your assets are taxed globally. So with the Americans,
they either become Australian citizens or go back and, guess what, back they go. I
am the anchor. I keep the company together over the long-term. I have to be
Australian.”
Australian Chairman, Services Company
For different reasons, a similar practice was reported by US respondents. Role duality was
highlighted as requiring a ‘hands on’ approach to both the management of the enterprise and
the leadership of the board. In terms of skill set, preference was given to executive track
record, executive experience and managerial skills over boardroom capability. Consequently,
most US chairmen reported distinctly favouring US centric executives who have the
understanding, insight and sector background relevant to US based home markets.
“Understanding the sector and knowing the US market is vital.”
US Chairman, IT Company
It was the British chairmen who reported a broader, international reach in terms of recruitment
practice. Proximity to Europe and to the USA and the drive for penetration of non home
based markets was seen to require the firm’s top executives to display international skill and
experience. Therefore, for both CEO and chair roles, the search parameters were broad
encompassing track record, breadth of experience, international exposure, sectoral knowledge
and particularly personal leadership capability. It was the British who more emphasised the
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leadership capacity of the individual as against other factors such as knowledge of home
markets.
“Being British means being international. Our reach is principally northern
hemisphere. Also we are probably one of the most open markets in the world.
That means the search for talent has no boundaries.”
UK Chairman, Investment Company
Domicile
Mindful of their executive accountabilities and consequently being needful to attend to
operational details, Australian chairmen reported that it was common practice for the chair to
reside in the same city as the headquarters of the company. For the majority of US firms, the
CEO element of the dual role determined that the chairman remained geographically close to
the headquarters of the firm.
As far as British chairmen were concerned, the domicile of the chairmen was not considered a
concern. A substantial number of British respondents reported being chairmen of British, US
and Continental European companies. Travelling considerable distances to board meetings
and accompanying the CEO on international tours on behalf of the firm, was reported as ‘part
and parcel of the job’.
Counter Balancing Role
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Differences of substance not only concerned the range of activities and responsibilities of the
role of chairman but also of the counter balancing influence to the chairman of the board.
Partly driven by fear of further scandal but also by the realisation that the central role of
chairman allows for potential domination of the board, all three sample groups reported an
additional role being available for providing a counter balancing influence to that of the
chairman. The role of senior independent director (SID) on UK boards is paralleled by an
equally deliberately crafted role on US boards, that of lead independent director (LID). No
specifically determined role such as that of SID or LID was reported as designed for
Australian boards. Through default, the single source of counter argument to the Australian
chairman was expected from the deputy chairman. However, not all Australian boards
reported they constituted the role of deputy chairman, some viewing the position as
unnecessary and others declaring already robust debate on the board.
The emerging opinion across the three sample groups was that the role of ‘independent’
director had only recently been introduced and, as such, it was too early to ascertain the
effectiveness of the SIDs or LIDs. Yet despite recent introduction, certain chairmen reported
the role of independent director as offering a valuable contribution to board dynamics and
board functioning. Emphasised was the importance of selecting the ‘right’ candidate to the
job. Particular chairmen described the difficulties of balancing the tension of leading the
board and being attentive to the management of the firm, whilst nurturing a cohesive but
challenging working environment. Unable to work on ‘two fronts’, the value of the
independent director was described as ‘evident’.
Whether in favour of the independent director concept or not, the need for challenge within
the boardroom was acknowledged. Most recognised the potential for ‘group think’ both on
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boards and on the top team. Thus, the contribution of the lead/independent director was
considered as influenced by cultural characteristics, whether of a national nature or more
specifically the culture of a particular board. British respondents considered that the views
and positions adapted by the CEO and chairman were overtly challenged within the
boardroom or within informal cliques prior to board meetings, which acted as preparation for
an organised confrontation at the formal meeting. In the words of one UK chairman, “British
NEDs offer quiet defiance.”
“Yes, there have been quite a few occasions when I and others should have spoken
up. But after a while something does come out, either from behind the scenes or
upfront. You see, the reason we don’t need SIDs is that in Britain, a NED is there
to challenge at the committee meetings as well as on the main board. Sometimes a
bit untidily, but challenge does come. That’s your job, if not, resign.”
UK NED, Energy Company
The predominant view expressed by US NED/independent directors (not so much US
chairmen) was that of inhibition at board meetings. Challenging the chairman/CEO was
reported as uncomfortable and unwelcome. A substantial proportion of US NED/independent
director respondents reported that no matter how appropriate or timely the challenge, the level
of discomfort experienced by the other board members created ‘an atmosphere’ inhibitive of
further discussion. Thus, most US board directors reported that their skills and experience
were considerably under utilised. Only ‘favoured’ directors were ‘offered’ sufficient airtime
to express their views.
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“You need to be someone famous to get listened to on this board. It’s all down to
the personality of the president/CEO/chair.”
US Independent Director, Pharmaceutical Company
The reported experience of the Australian NED was that of ‘rugged conformism’.
Emphasised was the importance of teamwork and, as board, working together as a cohesive
group. However, further exploration highlighted an unwillingness by individual board
members to offer contrary opinion to the group’s (board directors) shared mindset. In fact,
one Australian NED linked teamwork with conformism. She made her views public by
suggesting to the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) that they cease,
“teaching teamwork on boards and instead emphasise that boards are representative forums
where criticism and comment concerning the future of the firm should be made whilst
maintaining commitment to the board and the company’s vision.” This female board director
was seen as outspoken by her peers. A minority of Australian respondents agreed with her
equating teamwork on boards with ‘group think’ which in their opinion was symptomatic of
‘no desire’ to change. However, the majority held the opposite view, linking board cohesion
with effective team relations.
“We are all about teamwork and we have a really good team on this board. In fact,
my number one criteria for a new board member is will they fit into this team?”
Australian Chairman, Securities Company, making a public presentation to
chairmen and non executive board members.
Tenure
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Despite differences concerning the style and contribution of NEDs and independent directors
and executive and non executive chairmen (whether individually, board or nationally
determined), unanimity of opinion emerged across the three groups concerning the effect of
one demographic factor on chair and board performance, namely tenure. Those chairmen and
board members who considered themselves, and, in turn, were also considered by their board
colleagues, as holding ‘deep’ insight concerning the value advantage of the firm, its strengths
and weaknesses and why the firm was differentiated against competitors (or not), had been
involved with the affairs of the company and its board for a considerable period of time.
Further, UK and Australian companies which consistently exhibited higher than expected
levels of performance and whose chairmen and NEDs reported their boards as high
performing, attributed such continued success to being in role for between 12 to 15 years. US
chairmen and board members considered length of tenure equally necessary to make a
consistent difference to the performance of the board and the firm. US respondents quoted
eight to ten years as the necessary period to make a significant impact on the board of US
companies.
“Do you know how long the chairman and I have worked together? Well, so far,
11 years and we and the board and the business are simply getting better and
better.” (A point of view confirmed by the chairman and an NED of the same
board).
UK CEO, Tobacco Company
Certain respondents admitted that they broke “every governance rule in the book” (US
chairman) concerning role related tenure. For UK board members, time was considered as
important in order to evolve an intimacy of relationship with executive management. UK
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chairmen encouraged the forming, and NEDs in particular reported being encouraged to form,
‘buddying’ type relationships with senior and functionally specialist managers in the company
in areas as health and safety, the environment, corporate reputation, supply chain, etc.
Buddying emerged as less popular with US and Australian chairmen. However, all the
respondents across the three sample groups strongly emphasised that the longer board
members worked together, the more meaningful their relationships became and the greater
their understanding of the organisation and its strength, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies, the
greater the opportunity for the chairman and CEO to evolve a shared mindset concerning the
vision for the future of the organisation. By being together longer, success bred success. The
more successful the business, the more effectively rated was the board by its members and by
full-time management. Further, a longer term developed intimacy of relationship was
considered as enhancing of robustness of conversation. Many described the assertive, and at
times uncompromising, conversations that took place where pertinent issues were raised but
in such a manner that the relationships were maintained as ‘professional and workable’.
“I almost enjoy having broken the governance rules. Me and the MD have known
each other for ages. We get on well. We understand each other. The relationship
is now more open than ever and, in turn, so are the board and the management. It
is crazy to get people to leave when they have just really got to know each other
and their job.”
Australian Executive Chairman, Food Products Company
Across the three groups, it was considered the chairman’s responsibility to nurture a culture
which held as central the dynamic of ‘speak your mind whilst being mindful of others’.
Despite recognising length of tenure as advantageous, US chairmen particularly discouraged
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board members forming a deeper relationship with the managers of the firm. Conscious of
Sarbanes-Oxley and ‘being seen to corrupt’ the independence of board members, US
chairmen admitted their setting limits to interaction between the professional management
and the board.
“I try really hard to be chairman of the board and then separately CEO of the
company, even though I hold both positions. On the board, I make it my job for all
to say anything they want and one way I do that is to visit, at least once a year,
each of the independent/non executive directors on their home turf and listen to
what they say. They feel better, I feel better. Overtime, we have developed a
healthy respect for each other and most of all, an open style. Making the effort to
see them and time spent together have been invaluable to making this board work
well.”
US Chairman/CEO/President, Insurance Company
“I know the board would really like to get to know our managers better but with the
current climate on governance, audit and regulation as it is, I thought it best to
keep the two separate.”
US Chairman/CEO/President, Healthcare Company
Governance Pursuit
Irrespective of the source of governance imperative, such as legislation, voluntary codes,
stock exchange listing requirements, the topic of governance induced two principal responses
from the study respondents, “doing it in any case but not making a big deal of it”, and “what
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an unproductive use of time but doing it in any case”. ‘It’ refers to governance application in
terms of the adoption of particular processes, disciplines and protocols. Those chairmen and
NED/independent directors who viewed their board and company as high performing (a
perspective also supported by relevant others), remarked that recommended or obligatory
governance principles were already being proactively applied – so nothing new! The push, at
a national level, to transparently adopt particular disciplines of governance was already
‘underway’ in the company, thus emphasising the pursuit of best practice. However, most
complained of the cost of adopting latest governance disciplines to the letter of the ‘law’.
For the remainder, who were the majority, governance was viewed as an expensive irritant
that would only introduce minimal improvement to the ‘true’ governance challenges the
company faced. Many chairmen and NEDs in this group admitted that governance (or the
lack of it) was not the problem. What was, was poor leadership and as a consequence,
dysfunctional dynamics at board level and top team level. Those who admitted to
dysfunctionality of both leadership and board and management relationships also admitted
that both board members and the senior managers of the firm were fully aware of such
concerns, as they were of their effect on the board and the firm as a whole. Many confirmed
that the level of dysfunctionality, despite all other urges to act, created such discomfort that
board members and even senior managers became ‘paralysed’. The situation described was
of “knowing what to do, knowing what would happen if no action took place and still doing
nothing.” (US Independent Director).
“The relationship between the CEO and chair is bad and has been for sometime.
You tell me how Higgs or any other code is going to sort out two emotional egoists
(chairman and CEO) who want their own way, frighten everybody, but in their own
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way are brilliant but not when they are together. They are progressively damaging
the company but nothing is visible on any one day. Never mind governance, we
need a good SID and that is the last thing we are going to get whilst these two are
around.”
UK NED, Energy Company
Many of the respondents raised the question, “so how will governance sort out a problem of
leadership?” Certain US respondents considered Sarbanes-Oxley to be a negative influence
on board functioning. Certain admitted to a tick box mentality being even more encouraged
and driving corrupt practice ever more underground due to the fact that governance
procedures were adhered to but no real changes were forthcoming. Due to having to visibly
act, the suspicion of wrongdoing would not be raised, with each board member justifiably
claiming that they were not in possession of evidence for further enquiry at the time of
governance audit.
“Things are bad here. We just don’t say what we should. On top of that,
Sarbanes-Oxley is being applied and nothing is really going to happen. In fact,
one of the board members said something to me the other day and I said – can you
prove it? - if not, I don’t want to know. I know that is not the right attitude but I
have my reputation to protect. I am not unusual and for so many of us we
recognise Sarbanes-Oxley is going to drive corruption even more underground. It
will take years to dig out. Bad leadership is not solved by governance regulation.
You need an equally strong leader to challenge the status quo.”
US Independent Director, Property Company
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Conclusion
The breadth of discretion available to each incumbent to determine the nature of the role of
chairman emerged from this study as extensive. In fact, the researchers involved admitted to
initially finding it difficult to ascertain common themes across interviews. For them, the early
stages of the research was experienced as tracking the idiosyncratic nature of each chairman.
Additional to its breadth of scope and irrespective of the level of remuneration, the role of
chairman is confirmed as influential and powerful in shaping the board, directly (or indirectly)
determining the strategy of the firm and in nurturing a more proactive and enabling or
dysfunctional ‘culture’ within the enterprise.
It was not until the study took on an international dimension that it became clear that
individual board and firm context, in themselves, are not sufficiently influential demographics
to determine chairman role, configuration and behaviour. At the national level, demographic
determinates significantly emerged as effecting the role boundaries and orientation of
chairmen. Geographic particulars, such as knowledge of home markets, ex patriot
recruitment, the nature of governance stipulation (voluntary or legislative), role separation or
duality and preference for executive on non executive status, significantly affected board
dynamics, the nature of the chairman/CEO relationship and ultimately the effectiveness of the
board and the firm.
Additional to the particulars of practice within countries, the influence of ‘the leader’, namely
the individual, irrespective of the role held was recognised as the ultimate driving force of the
firm. Whoever that leader is, still the leader was reported as the critical factor in determining
firm success. Irrespective of governance practice and role separation or duality, one person
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was seen to determine the success or failure of the enterprise. Those considered to have
positive effect displayed a range of styles and approaches, best suited to the business
challenges facing the company. Those who consistently fostered dysfunctionality had one
style – my way only – and one feature of personality – my way only! The study results
highlight that the influence of that one man/woman can so predominate that governance
becomes of secondary concern.
Thus, despite nationally determined practices, despite role delineation (or not) and sound
governance application (or not), the values, qualities and behaviour of the leader(s) emerge as
a key ingredient to determining firm success. So why the attention to boards and the role of
chairman? It was the Ancient Greeks who defined governance in the form of a person,
namely, the Kyvernitis – the oarsman or helmsman of the ship who guides the vessel through
calms and storms. The term survives today. In Modern Greek, the term for government is
Kyvernisi. What has not survived, however, is the duality of the leader (the helmsman),
namely their influence and also adoption of the necessary disciplines for guiding the vessel or
today’s modern equivalent, the firm, through a ‘storm’. As the US independent director
declared, “how can Sarbanes sort out problems of dysfunctional leadership?”
Well, one response has been to introduce impersonal governance protocols to provide
boundaries and controls to the actions and influence of the leaders of the enterprise. But what
of the other side, the personal side? The results of the survey reported in this chapter
emphasise that the modern day Kyvernitis is the chairman. The chairman is the bridge
between the management and the audit, overseeing and controlling body of the firm, namely
the board. Whatever else, the chairman determines governance pursuit, drives the board but
also is increasingly influential in setting the cultural tone of the organisation. In effect, the
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chairman’s influence (as a person) parallels their adoption of governance protocols. It is no
surprise, therefore, to discover that those companies considered successful are better led and
display sound governance. The converse seems to be a truism that those companies poorly
led pay lip service to governance practice. The combination of effective leadership and
governance protocol application distinguish the better run company. Perhaps one of the more
sensitive challenges to face is the changing of the leader(s). In the better run and better
performing enterprise, it is the chairman (or in the USA, the board) that discusses poor
performing CEOs and determines the appointment of their successor. In reality, it is the
chairman, less so the board, who determines the nature of CEO performance and either
supports or ensures the CEO’s departure.
The duality of governance (person and protocol) is back in the form of the chairman, a role
that is now concluded to hold equal stature to that of the CEO and increasingly so in the USA.
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